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The Pre-Trial Conference'
By DAVID Dow*
In civil litigation disputes are supposed to be settled in ac-
cordance with the facts and the applicable law. Procedure is the
mechanics of this process of settling disputes. After hundreds of
years of experimenting it is pretty generally agreed that it is bet-
ter to have one procedural system for all kinds of civil cases rather
than to have different systems depending on whether the basic
dispute involves an assault and battery, a failure to pay a promis-
sory note, a mortgage foreclosure, or a complicated fraud. It is
also generally agreed that the system should be uniform through-
out all the courts of general original jurisdiction, at least within
each State. It is better to have all lawyers fairly familiar with one
system than to have so many different systems that no one could
be familiar with them all. Even the differences today between
civil and criminal procedure are the cause of tremendous con-
fusion in the minds of many lawyers. It is infinitely better that the
lawyer's time be spent on the merits of his case and not on wading
through a multitude of procedural peculiarities.
The amazing thing is that we have been able to devise any
single system which can adequately solve all of the problems of
procedure which may arise in the hundreds of different kinds of
disputes which the courts are daily asked to settle. There are, of
course, many who do not think we have yet devised such a system;
no one believes we have reached perfection. But without doubt,
the changes that are being made today are in the direction of
simplifying the rules so that there will be less chance of stumbling
into technical pitfalls and of providing flexibility in the rules so
* Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law, Lincoln, A.B.,
J.D., University of Michigan. Member New York and Nebraska bars.
'Over the past ten years no subject has been given more pages of print in the
Law Reviews and Bar Journals than that of Pre-Trial. I can therefore hardly
claim originality for any of the ideas expressed here. I have rather attempted to
point out the relation of Pre-Trial to the various aspects of civil litigation, to show
its tremendous scope, and to raise a number of the important problems which the
average trial lawyer and judge will meet in using it, with the hope that such an
over-all picture will make its general use understandable and that such familiarity
will help to make it successful in Kentucky.
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that they do, more adequately, provide a means of handling many
different kinds of cases.
The pre-trial conference2 is one of the devices for securing
this flexibility. In point of time it normally comes toward the end
of the period set aside for the determination and disclosure of
what the disputes really are, that is the pleading stage, and shortly
before the time for the presentation of information and argument
to the dispute-settler, that is the trial stage. It is designed to
provide certainty and flexibility in both the pleading and trial
stages, to tie the two together, and to help in the securing of in-
formation. There is nothing particularly new or unusual in a con-
ference between the judge and attorneys. Such conferences have
always been held informally and problems of law or fact peculiar
to the case discussed and sometimes solved. The novelty so far
as American administration of justice is concerned lies in making
the conference explicitly a part of the expected procedure of a
civil case and in providing formal sanctions to make it a useful
device.3
But the pre-trial conference is also new in another context.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and those now adopted in
Kentucky, establish a method of determining and disclosing the
precise nature of the disputes quite different from that of the
Common Law or the American Codes. This determination of
' Rule 16 of the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure, promulgated by the
Court of Appeals of Kentucky, effective July 1, 1953 provides as follows:
In any action, the court may in its discretion, and the circuit court shall on
motion, direct the attorneys for the parties to appear before it for a conference
to consider:
(1) The simplification of the issues;
S2) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings;
3 The possibility of obtaining admissions -of fact and documents which will
avoid unnecessary proof;
(4) The limitation of the number of expert witnesses;
(5) The advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a commissioner;
(6) Such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action.
The court shall make an order which recites the action taken at the conference,
the amendments allowed to the pleadings, and the agreements made by the
parties as to any of the matters considered, and which limits the issues for trial
to those not disposed of by admissions or agreements of counsel; and such order
when entered controls the subsequent course of the action, unless modified at or
before the trial to prevent manifest injustice. The court in its discretion may
establish by rule a pre-trial calendar on which actions may be placed for considera-
tion as above provided and may either confine the calendar to jury actions or to
nonjury actions or extend it to all actions.
'The history of the formal Pre-Trial movement has been too often explained
to repeat here. See 38 Ky. L.J. 302; Sunderland, The Theory and Practice of Pre-
Trial Procedure, 36 MicH. L. R.v. 215 (1937); Articles cited in 3 Moore's FEa-
.PAL PRAQICE 1102; NrmAs, Pnx-Tkau& 1-12,
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issues is no longer to be a battle of evasion required to be fought
out in the mists of uncertainty4 but is to be postponed until the
parties and their attorneys have had an opportunity, buttressed
by the sanctions of the discovery rules, to learn the evidence of
the facts behind the claims or defenses of both sides. To be sure,
the complaint and answer must set out the confines of the con-
troversy in a general way, but the formulation of the precise issues
or disputes is to await the development of the facts. Consequently
it is highly desirable to provide a time and a proceeding wherein
that can be done, and this is one of the functions of the pre-trial
conference under the so-called "notice theory" of pleading.5 It
may not always be necessary even under this theory of pleading,
but it is much more apt to be so than under the method of fact
pleading of the Field Codes.6 In this sense the order which results
from the pre-trial conference becomes a part of the technical
process of pleading.
The first function, then, of the pre-trial conference is to con-
sider "the simplification of the issues" and "the necessity or de-
sirability of amendments to the pleadings." In this it should be
so developed that the pleadings and the order taken together
provide a fair blue print of the way in which the trial is expected
to develop. Since it is agreed that one of the basic functions of
pleadings is to give notice of one's claims and defenses, it follows
that the attorneys should be able after the conference to state
with confidence and certainty precisely what issues will be pre-
sented for determination at the trial. There is no place under
these rules for the kind of surprise that was quite possible under
the permissible broad pleading concepts of the Common Law,
and even under the Field Codes, where an allegation of general
negligence would support any kind of negligent conduct which
might be proved at the trial.7 The problems of variance should
be anticipated and erased at the pre-trial conference.
'Perhaps resulting in the startling disclosures that the defendant was negligent
in that he was driving his car negligently and the plaintiff was equally at fault in
that he was not conducting himself with the care and prudence that a reasonably
prudent man would have exercised under the circumstances.
sI place "notice" in quotes because it seems to me to be a misnomer. The
problem is notice of what?
' It is interesting to note that pre-trial has a major role in the system of
pleading suggested by Professor Cleary. The Uses of Pleading 40 Ky. L.J. 46
(1951).
1.CLAr, HANDBOOx OF THE LAw OF CODE PLEADING, 300.
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The variance problem can arise, of course, with respect to
various levels of generality. In the first place it can involve com-
pletely different claims arising out of different fact occurrences.
Even under "notice" pleading these should have been separately
stated in the complaint. But so long as the statute of limitations
has not run, there is no reason to deny to the plaintiff the right
to amend them in the pre-trial conference. The defendant would
undoubtedly be entitled to a continuance if he could show that
he could not be adequately prepared to meet them, but one of the
purposes of the pre-trial conference is to set the trial for a day
certain. Similar considerations should govern the addition by
defendant of a counter-claim, either compulsory or permissive.
There is an added problem here in the rare case in which the de-
fendant is a non-resident and it would be impossible to obtain
personal jurisdiction over him if the plaintiff were required to
start a new action. It is unlikely that the court would have the
power to permit such an amendment.8
In the second place the plaintiff may be proceeding on dif-
ferent theories of substantive liability: contract or tort, express
contract or quantum meruit, trade mark infringement or unfair
competition, actual or constructive fraud. Or he may be seeking
alternative remedies. Here it is not so clear that the complaint
will, or necessarily should, have disclosed the true legal theory
of the claim. In fact the plaintiff may be changing, or adding to,
his concept of the case at the time he brought the action. It is
clear, however, that the defendant is entitled to know the various
theories that plaintiff proposes to try, just as plaintiff is entitled to
know the various defenses that defendant proposes to try. Since
alternative, hypothetical, and inconsistent pleading is specifically
permitted by the Rules,9 there should be no objection to bringing
in such new theories at this stage, with the possible objection of a
substantive estoppel if a different remedy is sought after de-
fendant has detrimentally changed his position in reliance on the
remedy first claimed.
In the third place the plaintiff may be adding what courts
have sometimes called a new "ground of recovery" or new speci-
8 RESTATEMENT, JUDGSFMENrS, Sec. 5, comment g. The problem is fully dis-
cussed in Frumer, Jurisdiction and Limited Appearance in New York: Dilemma of
the Non-resident Defendant, 18 FoRD. L. REv. 73, 88 (1949).
9 Rule 8.05 (2).
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fications of wrong or injury within the same legal theory and
cause of action, such as different specifications of negligence,
different damages resulting from the same wrongful acts, addi-
tional breaches of the same contract, new acts by defendant
which also constitute a nuisance. Here the Rules do not contem-
plate that any such grounds will have been delineated in the com-
plaint. Nor is there any particular necessity that they be stated
in the record in order to apply the doctrines of res judicata or
collateral estoppel in some future case. Whether or not this sort
of thing should be dealt with at the pre-trial conference is not so
clear. As to items of damage, yes, and it is doubtful if plaintiff
would even object to such a disclosure. But with respect to a
precise description of the way in which defendant acted wrong-
fully there must be kept a fair balance between the idea of notice
to defendant such that he will be able to meet the plaintiff's
claim with well prepared evidence and argument, and permitting
plaintiff sufficient latitude to take fair advantage of the evidence
as it actually develops at the trial.10 Nor should defendant's search
for information and understandable efforts to confine the plaintiff
go so far as to violate the privilege of plaintiff's counsel not to dis-
close all of his work-product or plan of conducting the trial. At
least this is so if the rule of Hickman v. Taylor" is to be followed
in Kentucky.
12
Rule 80.02 in fact goes so far as to prevent one party from
securing the production and inspection of any writing that reflects
an attorney's legal theories. But the discovery of an attorney's
memoranda may be entirely different from requiring him to be
specific about the particular theory or theories of substantive law
on which he intends to rely at trial. This type of disclosure can
hardly be said to hamper counsel unduly in his preparation for
trial by keeping him from writing down his ideas and making a
trial brief, which was the reason given by Justice Murphy for his
dictum with regard to the disclosure of legal theories in Hickman
v. Taylor.'" An examination of the various examples of pre-trial
conferences 14 indicates that the general theory of recovery claimed
" See, for example, Duffy v. Gross, 121 Colo. 198, 214 P. 2d 498 (1950).
329 U. S. 495 (1947).
"That it was intended to be followed is clear from the Notes of the Kentucky
Civil Code Committee to Preposed Rule 26.02. Tentative Draft, pages 78-79.
Supra, Note 11.
"Such demonstrations have been printed in various legal journals. For typical
KENTucxY L~w JouRNAL
by plaintiff is one of the things which may properly be con-
sidered.15 Even under Codes which do not adopt the broad prin-
ciples of discovery it is certainly not uncommon for trial judges
to require counsel to exchange trial briefs of the law they think
applicable, often of the evidence as well. It is to be hoped that
the theory of pleading which requires notice of a party's position
sufficient for his opponent to meet it fairly, if he can, will not be
endangered by a Rule which was designed merely to make sure
that all of an attorney's office memoranda would not be subject to
indiscriminate inspection.
The pre-trial conference has yet another function with respect
to the pleading stage of the law suit. Not only must there be a
time and place for permitting changes and additions, but also for
deletions. The Rule provides that there be an effort to simplify
the issues. Defense counsel has just as much right to know that
plaintiff is not going to press a particular claim or theory of
liability as he has to know what he is going to litigate at trial.
And similarly plaintiff has a right to know what defendant in good
faith intends to controvert at the trial and what defenses which
he pleaded he intends to litigate and those he does not.16 But
this particular facet of the Rule is more specifically a part of the
problem of fact admissions.
The issues can also be simplified, or the decision of them
simplified, in another way. Certain issues of law may be presented
under Rule 12 either by answer or by motion and may be heard
either before or at trial in the discretion of the judge. By the
time of the pre-trial conference the case may very well be at such
a stage of fact development and agreement that such issues can
be then determined, or that the judge can see that a hearing on
the specific issue in advance of trial would be advantageous. If
so, these problems should be raised and considered.17
The case as pleaded may also involve a large number of un-
related claims, or a number of different parties whose claims or
examples, see: 88 Ky. L. J. 809 (1950); Nims, Prx-Tr AL, 191; 4 F.R.D. 35
(1944); 11 F.R.D. 8-43 (1950); 40 ILL. B. J. 348 (1952).
' See also Delehant, The Pre-Trial Conference in Practical Employment: Its
Scope and Technique, 28 NEB. L. REv. 1, 18 (1948).
" 3 MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcncE 1114.7 It should be noted throughout that Rule 16 speaks of "considering" various
problems of pleading and trial. Many things may be thus brought before the con-
ference and discussed without there being any intention of reaching a final
decision.
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defenses may be in part related to each other and in part not.
The theory of the Rules is that such a mixture of claims, counter-
claims, and cross-claims and of different parties can harm none
of the parties during the pleading stage; but it may be quite harm-
ful at the trial stage, particularly when a jury is involved. Even
the plaintiff who has joined a large number of claims-for over-
time wages due 100 employees under the Fair Labor Standards
Act, for example-may not wish to try all of these claims together
for fear of confusing the jury. Under Rule 42 either party may
ask that these several claims be severed for trial. A separate
motion for this purpose can, of course, be made, but there is no
reason why it cannot also be considered at the pre-trial confer-
ence. A decision may be made there or a separate hearing
ordered for further consideration. Similarly the problem of con-
solidation could be covered. It should be remembered, however,
that opposing counsel is entitled to notice of the hearings on such
pre-trial motions' and could quite properly object to any decision
of them at the pre-trial conference when he was not advised in
advance that they would be brought up. The possibility that such
problems might be raised for discussion at the pre-trial confer-
ence does not mean, therefore, that they should be decided there,
but the discussion may measurably lead to a more expeditious de-
termination at a later date.
The second major function of the pre-trial conference deals
with the problem of simplifying the trial; indeed, it also may lead
to an abandonment of the trial altogether. The Rule provides
that the conference may consider the "possibility of obtaining ad-
missions of fact and documents which will avoid unnecessary
proof' and the "limitation of the number of expert witnesses."
This supplements the discovery rules with respect to judicial ad-
missions by seeking to cut out issues of ultimate fact- the
existence of a contract, for example-upon which there is no real
controversy; with respect to evidential facts by seeking admissions
where there is no controversy but where the ultimate fact may
still wish to be controverted-the weather conditions at the time
of an accident, for example; and with respect to seeking stipula-
tions which will avoid a mass of cumbersome formality in the lay-
ing of the technical foundation for the admission in evidence of
8 Rule 5.01.
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documents or of testimony when those foundation facts have no
direct bearing on ultimate issues in the case. It is less formal than
the procedure under Rule 88 or Rule 36 but the effect is appar-
ently the same if the opposing party is willing to make the admis-
sion. The fact admitted cannot be controverted at the trial.' If
the opposing party is not willing to make the admission the
sanctions of Rule 37 are not applicable to the request made at the
pre-trial conference. Thus Rule 86 must still be followed if the
opposing attorney is unable to make the admission at the confer-
ence.
There may be a number of simple admissions that the attorney
can make where it is clear that the facts cannot be controverted,
but which could not have been made at the time the answer or
reply was drafted. On the other hand the demand may also be for
admissions which the attorney cannot be expected to make on
short notice. Such problems should properly be handled under
Rule 86, and other information which should properly be sought
under Rule 26 relating to depositions or Rule 84 relating to the
production of documents is not within the scope of the admissions
of fact referred to in Rule 16. The judge should be alert to pre-
vent such inquiries which should be otherwise prosecuted under
procedures which provide proper notice and time as well as other
safeguards. 0 The informality of the pre-trial conference should
not be a cloak for evading those safeguards. The point to be made
is that the judge should not at this stage of the case attempt to
coerce an admission which an attorney is unwilling to make,
though he should make sure that the attorney is acting in good
faith in refusing.
It may be with respect to the admission of the genuineness of
documents or waiving the foundation for the admission of such
documents as maps or charts or tabulations that the attorney is
unwilling to make the requested waiver without a further oppor-
tunity to examine the map or chart or tabulation and perhaps to
question the person who actually prepared it. As a matter of fact
this sort of admission might just as well be handled by a simple
informal request for a stipulation, though the presence of the
"Miles Laboratories v. Seignious, 30 F. Supp. 549 (E.D. S.C. 1939); King
v. Edward Hines Lumber Co., 68 F. Supp. 1019 (D. Ore. 1946); 1 BARON AND
HOLTZOFF, FFDmL PRACTICE AND PROCEDuRE, 961 (1950).
' Delehant, supra n. 15, at 21-22.
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judge at the pre-trial conference may very well have the salutary
effect of preventing an attorney from denying the request merely
from a desire to be troublesome.2 The problem can be handled
in several ways. Requesting counsel might well supply the at-
torney with a copy of the document in advance of the conference
together with a notice that the demand for admission will be
made at the conference. If this has not been done it is not un-
usual to provide in the order that the document will be deemed
admitted insofar as foundation is concerned unless within five
days the opposing attorney specifically declines to make the ad-
mission, giving his reasons therefor. Or the attorney may simply
agree to make a written stipulation covering the foundation facts
after he has had an opportunity to examine the proposed exhibit,
without any binding reference to the problem in the pre-trial
order.
The provision of Rule 16 with regard to the limitation of the
number of expert witnesses may cause some confusion. Section
593 of the Civil Code of Practice of Kentucky 2 provided that the
trial court may "stop the production of further evidence on a
particular point, if the evidence upon it be already so full as to
preclude reasonable doubt." This section has been before the
Court of Appeals of Kentucky on a number of occasions and it
has indicated that the trial court has no power to limit the num-
ber of witnesses in advance, nor at the trial unless the condition
of certainty has occurred, and even then there is some doubt if
the issue to which the evidence is directed is a primary issue in
the case.23 This section of the Civil Code has been repealed by
Senate Bill 212, 1952 Legislature, Section 5, and Rule 16 is the
only legislative action to take its place. The fair intendment of
this legislative action seems to be that the trial court is now given
the power to limit in advance the number of expert witnesses to
be heard at the trial, a power which they did not possess before.
In view of the previous decisions of the Court of Appeals and the
Pre-trial is especially effective in this respect in complicated equity trials in-
volving a large number of exhibits. Yankwich, "Short Cuts" in Long Cases, 13
F.R.D. 41 (1952); Demonstration of Pre-Trial Procedure in an Antitrust Case In-
volving Patent Issues, 13 F.R.D. 207 (1953).
'2 Ky. CODE CIV. PRAC. ANN. Sec. 593 (Carroll 1938).
' Axton v. Vance, 207 Ky. 580, 269 S.W. 534 (1925); Eaton v. Green River
Coal & Coke Co., 157 Ky. 159, 162 S.W. 807 (1914); Taylor v. Commonwealth,
240 Ky. 437, 42 S.W. 2d 534 (1931).
2 147 NEB. xxxv (1946).
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requirements of the due process clause of the Federal Constitu-
lion, it seems equally clear that the power to limit does not mean
the power to deny either party the right to use any expert witness
necessary to a fair presentation of the case on an issue which is the
proper subject of expert testimony. It may be noted that other
States do not thus restrict this power to limit the number of
witnesses to experts. Nebraska by Court Rule 24 extends the
power to any "improper cumulative testimony"; North Dakota to
"character witnesses" 25 and other States by judicial decision have
permitted the judge to limit the number of general witnesses. 0
The fifth subdivision of the Rule permits the consideration of
the "advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a commis-
sioner." This must be read in connection with Rule 53 covering
commissioners and the various statutes which permit the use of a
master or special commissioner. It must also be kept in mind
that the Kentucky Rules differ here, in at least one important
respect, from the Federal Rules. Under Federal Rule 53 a refer-
ence may be ordered in both jury and nonjury actions. In jury
actions the report of the master is limited to his findings, it does
not include the evidence, and the report is admissible as evidence
of the matters found by him.28 In Kentucky the use of a commis-
sioner is limited to court (i.e., nonjury) actions by Rule 53.02.
There is a little doubt that the Federal Rules, in dealing with
court actions, contemplate the use of masters in both equitable
and non-jury law cases where exceptional conditions require it.20
This is not so clear in Kentucky. One statute provides that the
commissioner "shall discharge the duties and have the power of
a master in chancery and as provided by law and the rules of the
court."3 0 This statute can be construed to include non-jury law
actions when taken in conjunction with Rule 53.02 which cer-
tainly may be a "rule of court" within the language of the statute.
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky has, however, on several oc-
casions referred to the commissioner as "merely an agent or as-
'N. D. REv. CODE, Sec. 28-1101 (1943).
See 21 A.L.R. 335 (1922); 48 A.L.R. 947 (1927).
'E.g. Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 27.010; 27.020; 27.040; 27.050; 27.060; 27.100;
25.280; 376.110.
' FD. R. Civ. P. 53(b) and 53(e) (3).
See 5 Moote's FEDm,,L PACmrc. 2939-2946.
'Ky. REv. STAT. § 27.040(2). Compare § 297.100: "The master commissioner
shall settle the accounts of insolvent estates adjudicated in the circuit court and
perform such other duties as the court requires of him."
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sistant of the chancellor,"31 which might be taken to limit his
power to equity cases. From the practical point of view there
would seem to be no reason why a commissioner should not be
used in a non-jury law action, if exceptional conditions require it,
to hear evidence and report such evidence and special findings
with respect to complicated factual issues. The trial process is
no different in an equity case from that in a non-jury law case,
through the equity case is probably more likely to develop com-
plicated accounting problems or similar complicated fact isues
in which the device of a reference will save the time of the court
and the more informal hearing will better serve the needs of
counsel and witnesses.
The Rule also contains an omnibus clause permitting the con-
sideration of "such other matters as may aid in the disposition of
the action." Under this almost any problem could be determined,
but it may be well to suggest a few of the principal items. In the
first place the result of the discovery procedure and the actual
admissions which have been made by the parties may show that
as a matter of law there is no fact issue to be determined. In this
case the action is in such shape that a motion for a Summary
Judgment under Rule 56 would be in order, and other courts have
gone so far as to enter an order disposing of the case in accordance
with the admitted facts.3 2 A similar situation may arise when the
court considers whether or not a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim for which relief can be granted has been made but
has been postponed under Rule 12. It seems preferable that only
in clear cases where all counsel consent should such a determina-
tion be made at the conference. The problems should properly
be brought on for separate hearing by a formal motion, though
the groundwork can be laid at the conference. 33
'Dunlap v. Kennedy, 73 Ky. (10 Bush) 539 (1874); Richardson's Guardian
v. Frazier, 247 Ky. 59, 56 S.W. 2d 708 (1938)3; Shauinon v. Ray, 280 Ky. 31, 132
S.W. 2d 545 (1939).
" Hilisborough County v. Sutton, 150 Fla. 601, 8 So. 2d 401 (1942); cf. Clay
v. Callaway, 177 F. 2d 741 (5th Cir. 1949); Nns, PRE-TIAL 121-129.
"On some occasions attorneys undertake to employ a pre-trial conference as
the time for the argument and presentation of motions. While that practice may
not be said always to be inappropriate, it is not the orderly course to pursue.
Motions ought quite uniformly to be separately heard pursuant to formal setting.
Actuay teir hearing is foreign to the thought underlying the institution of pre-
trial procedure. And in almost no event should an attorney be allowed to insist
upon the hearing, during such a session, of a motion or other pleading which he
then serves for the first time on his adversary." Delehant, supra note 15, at 25.
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In many cases there may be issues of law which would
normally be handled at the trial but which can be more efficiently
handled in advance of the trial. Among such questions is the
troublesome one of the allocation of the burden of proof in cases
where the law is not yet clear. If this can be decided before trial
it will leave counsel in a much better position to prepare for the
trial itself. Even if the burden is wrongly allocated it may be
that the verdict can be won on the evidence if counsel knows
ahead of time which way the judge is going to hold. He will not
have to run the risk of guessing wrongly that the judge will cast
the burden on the opposing party. At least if the issue of burden
of proof is discussed ahead of the trial it will give the judge a
better chance of making a correct ruling at the trial than if the
problem comes to him suddenly without an opportunity for in-
dependent consideration and research.
It may also be possible to determine ahead of the trial some
of the problems of admissibility of evidence which are bound to
arise at the trial. These may include such problems as whether
a particular issue is the proper subject of expert opinion evidence,
or whether certain parts of a proposed exhibit should be excluded
as hearsay or opinion, as in death certificates. So long as the
determination of the admissibility does not depend on the finding
by the judge of facts which are not admitted the admissibility of
evidence can be handled at the conference, but if evidence is
necessary the conference is hardly the place to offer such evi-
dence. Similarly, it may be possible to lay the groundwork at the
conference for the use of demonstrative evidence such as a
skeleton, or the mock-up of the scene of an accident.34 It is also
proper to consider the correct form of instruction on an issue on
which the law is in doubt.
If there is any problem involving the right to a trial by jury
it can certainly be handled thus ahead of the date set for trial
without the necessity of a motion to transfer the cause from one
docket to another. A word of warning may not be out of place in
this connection. Although the right to trial by jury is guaranteed
by the Kentucky Constitution35 and by Rule 88.01, under Rule
88.02 a jury must be specifically demanded, either generally or
See Befli, The Use of Demonstrative Evidence, 22 Miss. L. J. 284 (1951).
Section 7.
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as to specific issues, in writing not later than ten days after the
service of the last pleading directed to the issue. Thus the de-
mand must not be put off until the pre-trial conference. In the
Federal Courts there has been, however, some litigation with
respect to the right of a party to demand a jury after an amend-
ment to the pleadings which may, of course, be often granted at
the pre-trial conference; and the more extensive use of juries in
state courts may lead to similar problems there.
As interpreted by the Federal Courts the right to a jury under
the Constitution" and the Rule37 is dependent on the nature of
the particular issue to which the demand is addressed, viewed his-
torically; the action in its entirety is not necessarily one to be tried
to a jury, or one to be tried to a judge.38 And this point of view is
particularly significant when the same action may involve a multi-
tude of claims and defenses, both alternative and independent,
some of which are historically legal and some equitable. The
result has been that an amendment which does not introduce new
issues does not permit either party to demand a jury as of right
then for the first time.3 9 If a new legal issue is thus introduced by
amendment, a jury may be demanded as to that issue but not as
to any other issues in the case,40 and the question of the effect
upon the action of such demand may be considered by the judge
in determining whether or not to permit the amendment.
Under this category also comes one of the very important
functions of the pre-trial conference, which is to explore the
" U. S. CONST., Amendment VII.
'FED. R. Civ. P. 38(a).
" See: The Right to Jury Trial Under Merged Procedure, 65 HcAv. L. REv.
453 (1952) where the distinction between "issue" orientation and "action" orienta-
tion is carefully examined. 5 MooRE's FDERA. PRACTICE 24-30. The Circuit
Courts are in disagreement as to the proper method of handling a case where the
same issue is involved in both a legal and an equitable claim. The First Circuit
has permitted the judge to foreclose jury action on the issue by trying the equitable
claim first, Orenstein v. U. S., 191 F. 2d. 184 (1951), while the Eighth Circuit has
held that the constitution requires that the jury first determine the issue, Leimer v.
Woods, 196 F. 2d 828 (1952).
Reeves v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 9 F.R.D. 487 (1949).
405 MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcmcTE 325-329. Where the plaintiff has originally
asked for an equitable remedy and damages in connection therewith it may be
conceived that the latter is merely an adjunct to the equitable action and that a
jury is not therefore a matter of right, though this is not wholly consistent with
the "issue" theory. If the plaintiff waives his equitable remedy, he is not then
entitled to a jury on the damage claim, In re Canister Co., 182 F. 2d. 510 (3rd
Cir. 1950); but if he secures an amendment striking the equity claim he may have
a jury, Bereslavsky v. Coffey, 161 F. 2d. 499 (2d Cir. 1947). In the latter case
the judicial discretion has been invoked.
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amount of time it is estimated the trial will take so that the trial
judge may set the cases on the trial docket for a day certain with
some assurance that the dates will be kept and that he can keep
his engagements in other parts of his circuit. It is also desirable
for counsel to have a day certain for trial when there are witnesses
to be brought in from out of town. To be sure, this sort of prob-
lem can be and now is handled in an informal application to the
judge, but the conference provides a particular time for bringing
the problem to the attention of the judge when he has all of the
pertinent facts before him for decision including the probable
trial dates of other cases on the calendar.
A further problem which is considered under the omnibus
clause, and which is a natural by-product of the attempt to settle
a trial docket, is the troublesome one of settlement. Much of the
objection to the pre-trial conference comes from attorneys who
feel that they will be impelled to a settlement which they would
not be willing to make if it were not for the pressure of a judge
intent on clearing his docket. Nothing is said about settlement
in the Rule, but under the federal Rule and similar rules in other
States there can be no doubt that this may be one of the major
items at the conference. 41 In the Chicago courts, for example,
settlement appears to be a primary issue and special forms are
provided for the judge to use in making recommendations for a
fair compromise.4 2 The genesis of formal pre-trial in the United
States stemmed from a desire to clear dockets of cases which
would never come to trial, and the success in this endeavor has
always been pointed to as one of the great arguments for its
adoption. Although a procedure for getting rid of cases which
apparently are never going to be tried is a desirable thing in many
courts, the worth of pre-trial in the other areas should not be thus
minimized by an overemphasis of one of its many purposes. Nor
should such emphasis be mistaken as an invitation for a judge to
set himself up as an arbitrator of liability and damages when it is
apparent that the parties, or one of them, wants a trial by jury.
If the jury is to be done away with in civil cases, as it has for all
practical purposes in England, it should be done in the open, and
-Nnws, Pr.E-Tmi 12.4240 ILL. BAR J. 357 (1952).
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not by indirection. Nor should decisions be arrived at without
a complete opportunity for developing the facts.
Yet, with the foregoing warning in mind, there is every reason
to encourage the settlement of disputes when it is mutually agree-
able to all parties. If such a settlement is possible, it is desirable
that the State provide a time and place and an atmosphere in
which the unfortunate distrust of one party or attorney for an-
other may be dissipated. This is the primary function of the
judge in the promotion of settlements at the pre-trial conference:
to encourage but never to coerce. If this is the fundamental prin-
ciple, then the subsidiary questions become those of application
of that principle rather than flat rules of thumb as to what a judge
may or may not do in encouragement. The question is not
whether the judge should suggest a fair figure, whether he should
give his opinion as to the outcome of the isue of liability or the
issues of affirmative defenses, or who should initiate the settle-
ment discussion, but rather the manner in which these things are
done by the judge so that neither party shall have the impression
that he has been forced into a settlement without a full oppor-
tunity to present his case.
There are certain collateral problems as to how the pre-trial
conference should be handled which deserve attention but about
which it is difficult, if not impossible, to suggest any definite rules
of procedure. It has already been suggested that if the conference
is to develop all of the various functions as thoroughly as pos-
sible the time of the conference must be placed fairly near to the
time at which trial is contemplated. The Rule does not provide
that the conference shall be mandatory in all cases, though it is if
requested by counsel, nor does it seem advisable that it should be
unless the preparation of a trial docket is of major importance and
this can only be facilitated by a preview of all cases, whether or
not other advantages might be gained.
Similarly such questions as the formality with which the con-
ference is conducted, and whether a special calendar should be
set up will depend on the personality of the individual judge and
the amount of litigation in that court. But these problems, and
particularly the one of the proper time for the conference, are
complicated by the practical question of where the judge is. The
Rule makes no requirement as to where the conference should be
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held, but under Rule 77.02 it would appear that the conference is
a proceeding which may be held anywhere. Since the conference
does not contemplate a "hearing" in the sense that any formal
motions are to be determined, it can be held outside the judicial
district. If, however, it should appear that the conference might
develop any problem which would be the proper subject of a
hearing, it should be held within the judicial district in which the
action is pending in order to conform to Rule 77. Thus the pri-
mary consideration as to the time and place should be the con-
venience of the judge and the attorneys. This problem is partly
solved by the provision of Rule 78 that in each county there shall
be at least one motion day every month.
The Rule contemplates that there will be an order reciting
the action taken at the conference. Such order is "to control the
subsequent course of the action unless modified at the trial to
prevent manifest injustice."43 Specific amendments to the plead-
ings and admissions and stipulations should of course be included
in the order. Many judges state specifically in the order what the
issues at trial will be, and since this is one of the primary functions
of the conference it seems desirable for the order to do so. 44 Any
extra burden on the judge at the pre-trial stage will be amply re-
paid at the trial. It is the general practice of the federal judges
to prepare the report themselves, 45 some requiring the approval
of the attorneys to be noted by signature on the final report.40
All apparently agree that the report should be subject to exception
by the attorneys if it does not accurately state the results of the
conference, though the final determination is, by the Rule, that of
the judge.
As might be expected the question of how the order may be
modified and what factors involve "manifest injustice" has been a
fruitful source of litigation in the federal courts and in those states
where the Rule has been adopted. Many of the decisions are
collected by Nims47 and others48 and a detailed discussion of the
"Rule 16.
3 Moo s'S FEDEALI PacaIrcE 1124; Jenkins v. Devine Foods, Inc., 3 N. J.
450, 70 A. 2d 736 (1950).
' Delehant, supra n. 15, at 26.
" Shafroth, Pre-Trial Techniques of Federal Judges, 4 F.R.D. 183, 192 (1944).
It may also be drafted by the attorneys to be settled by the judge, similar to an
equity decree. Burton v. Weyerhauser Timber Co., 1 F.R.D. 571 (1941).1 Nnis, PRE-TRAr.L 163-174.
"60 YALE L. J. 175 (1951); 3 Wyo. L. REv. 78 (1948).
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cases here would not materially add to those discussions. The re-
sults may be summarized somewhat as follows.
The question of amendment or change may arise in three dif-
ferent areas: whether specific admissions of facts should be modi-
fied or stricken; whether issues which were not advanced at the
pre-trial or were specifically excluded from the case can be tried;
whether new parties or new claims can be added. Since the basic
consideration is one of justice to both sides on the merits of the
controversy, the first question to be answered is whether the re-
quested amendment unduly prejudices the opposing party. The
time when the change is offered is most significant here, since if
it is made by a formal motion to amend the conference order in
advance of trial the chance of prejudice is substantially lessened.
Although there is no express provision for successive conferences
in the same case, the federal courts have uniformly assumed that
they may be held within the discretion of the court. -9 The second
question is the extent to which the party offering the amendment
will be prejudiced if it is denied; will a denial have the effect of
excluding from the consideration of the judge or jury a fact issue,
or a claim or defense, which if it were permitted to be tried might
probably change the outcome of the action? To what extent will
the offering party be forever barred from litigating that particular
issue? In this respect it is less likely that the court will permit an
amendment which will add new parties or claims than one which
will withdraw a fact admission or add new issues by way of new
theories of recovery or defenses. The third question is whether
the party offering the amendment has acted in good faith. Here
the extent to which the opposing party has fairly disclosed his own
facts and theories is relevant, as well as the question of whether
the change is dictated by the discovery of new facts after the pre-
trial conference which the party should not have been expected
to have discovered before the conference. Also the time when the
amendment is offered, or notice thereof first given, is again im-
portant in assessing the good faith of the moving party.
It will be noted that the foregoing considerations are much the
same as those which should apply in determining a motion to
amend the pleadings under the Codes; but an entirely different
"Nnvs, PnE-TUAr 151-152; 1 BAIRO AND HOLTZHOF7, op. cit. supra n. 19,
at 961.
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policy problem is present when we are dealing with rules or pro-
cedure similar to the federal rules and particularly Rule 16. This
Rule is specifically designed to provide a time and a place where
desirable amendments can be made and where agreements limit-
ing the issues to be tried can be fixed. In order to make Rule 16
effective, counsel must be warned that the agreements reached
at the conference are not to be idly set aside. And since actions
speak louder than words some courts have been exceedingly strict
in refusing amendments or changes in the pre-trial order. 0 At the
very least the trial and appellate courts should require the party
seeking to change the pre-trial order to make a clear showing of
good faith, of injustice if the change is not permitted, and of
relatively small prejudice to the opposing party. Anything less
would seriously hamper the effectiveness of the procedure.51
Nor does it appear that such an attitude of reasonable ad-
herence to the order in any way conflicts with the provision of
Rule 15.01 that amendments to the pleadings "shall be freely
given when justice so requires." When, however, there has been
no amendment to the order proposed but the parties have actually
litigated an issue not covered by the pleadings of the order, a re-
fusal to treat that issue as a part of the litigation does conflict, in
theory at least, with Rule 15.02. Even here the New Jersey
Supreme Court has required a strict adherence to the limitations
of the pre-trial order and reversed for a new trial when the judg-
ment was based on issues actually litigated but not covered.52 Per-
haps the result in this case should depend on whether there was
any objection to the litigation of the issue at trial, since if there
was an objection it cannot be said that there has been any con-
sent, either actual or implied, to try the issue. It may also depend
upon the precision with which the order states the issues to be
tried.
It should be pointed out, in conclusion, that one of the primary
benefits of pre-trial is the better acquaintance of the trial judge
with the real controversy and consequently his ability to conduct
'"McCarthy v. Lerner Stores Corp., 9 F.R.D. 31 (1949); Bryant v. Phoenix
Bridge Co., 43 F. Supp. 162 (D. C. Me. 1942).
"Many cases are collected in 22 A.L.R. 2d 599 (1952).
"Jenldns v. Devine Foods, Inc., 3 N. J. 450, 70 A. 2d 736 (1950), criticized
in 60 YAL L. J. 175 (1951). Contra, Smith Contracting Corp. v. Trojan Con-
struction Co., 192 F. 2d 234 (10th Cir. 1951); Mayfield v. First National Bank,
137 F. 2d 1013 (6th Cir. 1943).
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the trial efficiently. This is, of course, particularly true when the
same judge handles both the pre-trial conference and the trial;
but it will also be true in other cases if the pre-trial judge is care-
ful to draft an order clearly delineating the issues. Thus, it is in-
cumbent on the judge as well as the attorneys to see that as many
of the problems as possible are dealt with at the conference. It is
suggested that to assure complete coverage, the judge prepare a
comprehensive check-list of all such problems for his own use.
In many cases it would probably be helpful if a copy of this check-
list was sent to each attorney along with the direction to appear
before the court for the conference. Not all items on the list would
be relevant to every case; but it would emphasize the importance
of the conference, the kinds of problems which can be solved be-
fore trial, and would encourage counsel to a proper preparation
for the pre-trial conference. Such a checklist might be somewhat
as follows:
SUGGESTED CHECK-LIST OF ITEMS WHICH
MAY BE RAISED AT THE PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE
I. Amendments to the Pleadings
A. New Parties
B. New Claims or Counterclaims
C. New Theories of Liability
D. New Allegations of Wrongful Conduct
E. New Elements of Damage
F. New Defenses
G. New Remedies
II. Striking Matter from the Pleadings
III. Consideration of Problems Presented by Motions or Pleas in
Abatement
A. To Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim
B. Relating to Jurisdiction
C. Relating to Venue
D. Relating to Separate Trials or Consolidation
E. Relating to Provisional Remedies such as
1. Temporary Injunctions
2. Attachments
3. Security for Costs
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IV. Admissions of Fact
A. Relating to Defendant's conduct
B. Relating to Plaintiffs Conduct
C. Relating to General Conditions Relevant to the Case
D. Relating to Damages
E. Relating to Value
V. Admissions Relating to the Genuineness of Documents
VI. Waiver of Foundation for Admission of Exhibits
A. Maps or Charts
B. Tabulations
C. Photographs
D. Blue Prints
E. Abstracts
F. Hospital Records
G. Public Records
H. Business Records
VII. Limitation of the Number of Expert Witnesses
VIII. Prelimiary Reference of Issues to a Commissioner
IX. Possibility of Summary Judgment
X. Special Trial Procedures
A. Burden of Proof
B. Admissibility of Evidence
C. Jury or Non-Jury Trial-Need for Alternate Jurors-Stip-
ulation with Respect to Majority Verdict
D. Proper Form of Instructions
E. Need for Special Verdict or Interrogatories (Rule 49)
F. Probable Time of Trial-Length and Date
XI. Possibility of Settlement
XII. Statement of Issues Remaining for Trial
